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Abstract
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (adopted by various states as well) allows
for the introduction of certain convictions at trial to impeach the credibility—
i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness. The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory,
are afforded greater protection throughout the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses. The most important distinction
between the standards that apply to these two classes of witnesses is that for
prior crimes of criminal defendants to be introduced to impeach their credibility, those wrongdoings must survive a special balancing test spelled out
within Rule 609. In contrast, evidence of prior crimes used to assess the character for truthfulness of non-criminal-defendant witnesses is subject to the
well-known balancing test found in Rule 403.
Critically, commentators, scholars, and courts alike (with one notable judicial distinction) have paid virtually no attention to the actual language of
Rule 609’s key operating provision applicable to criminal defendants. As
written, the rule is not merely more favorable to criminal defendants, as many
have easily concluded; it is manifestly inoperable. This crucial flaw in the
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rule has largely been overlooked.
After detailing the historical and legislative development of Rule 609, this
Article, for the first time: (1) shows that courts have been routinely applying
a similitude of Rule 609 that contravenes the express language enacted by
Congress, (2) demonstrates, through a Euclidean mathematical proof, that
Rule 609, as written, is inoperable against criminal defendants, and (3) evaluates several methods to address this longstanding, overlooked problem with
the rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (Rule 609), which is mirrored in many
states’ evidence codes,1 allows for the introduction of certain convictions at
trial to impeach the credibility—i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness.2 The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory, are afforded greater protection throughout
the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses.3
Although Rule 609 has been called “the most maligned of any Federal
Rule of Evidence,”4 commentators, scholars, and courts (with one notable judicial distinction discussed below) alike have paid little attention to the actual
language of its key operating provision.5 As written, the rule is not merely
more favorable to criminal defendants, as it should be; it’s manifestly inoperable.6 That notwithstanding, courts generally have been unconsciously applying a judicially created version of the rule that is wholly inconsistent with the
language Congress (and many state legislatures)7 actually enacted.8
After detailing the development of Rule 609,9 this Article will, for the
first time ever: (1) show that courts have been routinely applying a similitude
of Rule 609 that contravenes the express language enacted by Congress,10 (2)
demonstrate, through a Euclidean mathematical proof, that Rule 609, as
1. See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1987 (2016)
(“Forty-seven states, along with the District of Columbia, follow the federal government in permitting
impeachment of criminal defendants with their criminal records, but of those only seventeen states
follow FRE 609 either exactly or very closely.”).
2. FED. R. EVID. 609 (“The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction . . . .”).
3. See id.
4. Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 609 and Suggestions for Practical Reform, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 993, 995 (2018) (presenting data on how Rule 609 operates in practice); see also Jeffrey Bellin,
Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 292 & n.4 (2008) (explaining the controversy
behind Rule 609 and the practice of impeaching testifying defendants with prior convictions).
5. See infra Section II.D; see, e.g., Simmons, supra note 4, at 1035 (emphasis added) (“Rule
609(a)(1)(B) already contains a balancing test, which is ostensibly very favorable to the defendant:
prior convictions are only supposed to be admitted if their probative value outweighs their unfair prejudice.”).
6. See infra Section II.C.
7. See supra note 1.
8. See infra Section II.D.
9. See infra Section II.B.
10. See infra Section II.D.
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written, is inoperable against criminal defendants,11 and (3) evaluate several
methods to address this until-now overlooked dilemma that has resulted in a
near-universal misapplication of the rule, as well as an unrevealed circuit
split.12
I conclude by suggesting that the best solution is one that respects the
textualist approach to interpretation: having Congress rewrite the law or live
with the consequences of the current version.13
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 609 is based on the questionable premise—discussed in somewhat
greater detail below—that, in considering the credibility (i.e., the general
character for truthfulness) of a witness, a jury is entitled to hear about at least
some of that witness’s prior convictions (if there are any, of course).14 The
philosophical underpinnings of the rule, however, are not the main province
of this Article. Rather, the discussion herein is an economic analysis (in the
broad sense) of the theoretical application of the rule to criminal defendants.15
Rule 609 reads, in relevant portion, as follows:
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal
conviction: (1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than one year, the evidence: (A) must be admitted, subject to
Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the
witness is not a defendant; and (B) must be admitted in a
criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to that defendant . . . .16
As illustrated, Rule 609 incorporates a balancing test external to it—from
Rule 403—for use when determining whether the prior crimes of a witness

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Part III.
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 292.
See infra Section II.C.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
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who is not a criminal defendant should be admitted at trial.17 Rule 403 states:
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”18
In contrast, Rule 609 presents its own (internal) balancing test for criminal defendants.19 Critically, that internal balancing test simply refers to “prejudic[e],” while Rule 403 refers to “unfair prejudice.”20 Thus, under Rule
609’s terms, the probative value of impeachment evidence regarding a criminal defendant is balanced against all prejudice, while the probative value of
impeachment evidence regarding all other witnesses is balanced against unfair
prejudice.21 Subtlety of the linguistic distinction notwithstanding, that difference is dramatic.22
A. Statutory Interpretation
While colloquially “prejudice” equates with “unfairness”—to say the
least—like in the context of racism, concluding inconsequential the difference
between “prejudice” and “unfair prejudice” in the Federal Rules of Evidence
(which most states have also adopted)23 would be quite wrong. In the law of
evidence, “prejudice” has a far more specific meaning than in common parlance. Evidence is prejudicial to a party if it simply harms that party’s case
(and complementarily helps the opposing party’s case).24 Thus, crucially,
17. Id.
18. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
19. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).
20. Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B) (“[F]or a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence . . . must be admitted in
a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to that defendant . . . .”), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice . . . .”).
21. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 311. Bellin notes the lack of the modifier “unfair” in Rule 609 but
does not argue, as this Article does, that the language excludes prior convictions of a criminal defendant, no matter how probative. Id.
22. See infra Sections II.A–C.
23. See Kenneth W. Graham, State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA.
L. REV. 293, 293 (1990) (“A majority of the states . . . have adopted . . . statutes or court rules that
purport to codify the law of evidence along the lines of the Federal Rules.”).
24. See United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) (“By design, all
evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided.”).
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prejudice can be proper or improper, fair or unfair, and legitimate or illegitimate.25 This point cannot be overstated and requires careful attention, as the
objective definition of this term alone will largely determine the operation of
the entire body of evidence law.26
1. Defining the Terms
The archetype of fair prejudice is the “smoking gun,” which is aptly
damning to the criminal defendant. 27 In this case, the prejudice that the defendant incurs is exactly that which we expect and want.28 On the other hand,
close-up pictures of a victim’s bullet-ridden corpse are likely unfairly prejudicial, because they offer little additional useful information to a jury beyond
the already-known death, while likely inflammatory in a way that could cause
jurors to convict the defendant simply because he is the one before them.29
As detailed below, the two balancing tests compared herein are, in fact,
radically different.30 First, facially, Rule 609’s internal balancing test, required for criminal defendants, gives more weight to the harm to the defendant—i.e., it excludes from the jury’s purview more convictions—than does
Rule 403’s balancing test, which is applicable to all other witnesses.31 The
former excludes a criminal defendant’s prior convictions if they exhibit even
a scintilla more of the prohibited prejudice than probativeness; the latter excludes the prior convictions of a witness other than a criminal defendant only
if the convictions exhibit substantially more of the prohibited prejudice than
probativeness.32

25. See, e.g., 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 403.04[1] (2021).
26. See Hon. Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., The Evidence Rules Every New Trial Lawyer Should
Know, 45 LITIGATION 8, 11 (2019) (“Rule 403 is, next to hearsay, the most often cited rule of evidence.”).
27. See William Safire, The Way We Live Now: 1-26-03: On Language; Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/26/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-1-26-03-onlanguage-smoking-gun.html (repeating ellipses within original quotation) (“[The] figure of speech
meaning ‘incontrovertible incrimination’ . . . [derives from] an 1893 Sherlock Holmes story, ‘The
Gloria Scott’[:] . . . ‘We rushed into the captain’s cabin . . . there he lay with his brains smeared over
the chart of the Atlantic . . . while the chaplain stood with a smoking pistol in his hand at his elbow.’”).
28. See id.; Greenaway, supra note 26; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 25.
29. See Greenaway, supra note 26.
30. See infra Section II.C.
31. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 1001.
32. See id.; see also Bellin, supra note 4, at 309.
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Second—and the primary subject of this Article—the specific articulation
of the balancing test regarding criminal defendants considers all prejudice in
the balancing test, rather than just unfair prejudice.33 This articulation, however, produces a result whereby no credibility evidence survives the screen of
the prejudice filter, making the rule, in fact, nugatory.34 Adding to this confusion, or more likely because courts have unconsciously recognized this confounding dilemma, federal courts mostly have ignored the express language
of the rule—choosing to rewrite Congress’s words without offering any explanation for this usurpation of the legislative function.35
The First Circuit alone has recognized the actual balancing test in Rule
609 as it is written.36 Thus, Rule 609 should apply correctly in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island.37 Consequently,
there is an unrecognized circuit split between the First Circuit and all other
circuits, albeit, as discussed below, the First Circuit opinion has not even impressed lower courts within its own jurisdiction.38
2. Giving Meaning to All Words
In considering whether we should view the Federal Rules of Evidence’s
use of “unfair prejudice” and “prejudicial effect” as referring to the same or
different constructs, we must employ core rules of construction used in statutory, constitutional, and other textual interpretation.39 Two basic maxims apply: First:
Each part or section of a statute should be construed in

33. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 311.
34. See infra Section II.C.
35. See infra Section II.D.
36. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 160 (1st Cir. 2004).
37. About the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FIRST CIR., https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/about-court
(last visited Sep. 11, 2021).
38. See infra Section II.D. To add even further confusion to the issue, if that is possible, the First
Circuit case never applied Rule 609 to the facts of the case, as the issue on appeal didn’t so warrant,
and therefore, the understanding of the First Circuit seems not to have percolated down to the district
courts therein. See infra Section II.D.2.
39. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 25 (2018) (citation omitted) (“Often, a statutory dispute will turn on
the meaning of only a few words. Courts will interpret those words, though, in light of the full statutory context . . . . Over time, courts have created the ‘canons of construction’ to serve as guiding
principles for interpreting statutes.”).
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connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole . . . . A leading British case found that: To
discover the true construction of any particular clause of a
statute, the first thing to be attended to, no doubt, is the actual
language of the clause itself, as introduced by the preamble;
second, the words or expressions which obviously are by design omitted; third, the connection of the clause with other
clauses in the same statute, and the conclusions which on
comparison with other clauses, may reasonably and obviously be drawn. . . . If the comparison of one clause with the
rest of the statute makes a certain proposition clear and undoubted the act must be construed accordingly and ought to
be so construed as to make it a consistent whole. If after all
it turns out that that cannot be done, the construction that
produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency is
that which ought to prevail. . . . A statutory subsection may
not be considered in a vacuum[] but must be considered in
reference to the statute as a whole and in reference to statutes
dealing with the same general subject matter . . . . Courts
strive both to implement the legislature’s policy and harmonize all a statute’s provisions.40
Second:
It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be
given, if possible, to every word, clause[,] and sentence of a
statute. Courts construe a statute to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part is inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section does not destroy another, unless a provision is the result of obvious mistake or
error. Courts assume that every word, phrase, and clause in
a legislative enactment is intended and has some meaning
and that none was inserted accidentally. . . . When the legislature uses a term or phrase in one statute or provision but
excludes it from another, courts do not imply an intent to
include the missing term in that statute or provision where
40. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:5
(7th ed. 2018) (footnotes omitted).
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the term or phrase is excluded. Instead, omission of the same
provision from a similar section is significant to show different legislative intent for the two sections. Courts may disregard words and clauses present in a statute only through inadvertence if such words and clauses, on the basis of other
indicia, are repugnant to legislative intent.41
Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho, a noted textualist, aptly articulated the
seemingly simple but oft-ignored notion that “respect for text forbids us from
ignoring text.”42 And creating “surplusage” language violates the most compelling maxims of interpretation elucidated above—that each word in a statute
should be read as having meaning,43 and text must be read as a whole.44
The foundational concept underlying these tenets is that the democratic
branches make laws and the judicial branch members have no role in imposing
their personal policy preferences on outcomes under the guise of interpreting
the law.45 Relatedly, the text itself dictates the outcomes of cases, not the
41. Id. at § 46:6 (footnotes omitted).
42. Hewitt v. Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc., 983 F.3d 789, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2020), reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 989 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2021); id. at 796 (“[I]t should go without saying that
we are governed by the text . . . .”).
43. Id. at 798 (Ho, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 799 (second alteration in original) (“[I]t is a bedrock principle of statutory interpretation
that ‘text[s] must be construed as a whole.’” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is
more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter
to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its
many parts.”))).
45. See id. at 797 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002)). Notwithstanding Judge Wiener’s dissenting opinion’s claimed fidelity to textualism, he seems to show his true
colors when he highlights his policy concerns with the majority and concurring opinions: “I fear that
the result of the panel majority’s opinion will have lasting, negative repercussions, not just on the
petroleum industry, but on all industries in this region and in any region that finds the panel majority’s
opinion persuasive.” Id. at 803 (Wiener, J., dissenting). Perhaps Judge Wiener’s reasoning is related
to the fact that he “practiced mineral law for decades,” no doubt for the industry that would allegedly
suffer the “negative repercussions” of the majority’s opinion. Id. at 802–03. Indeed, the history of
the case is even more curious: Judge Weiner, who dissented from Judge Ho’s most recent opinion,
initially
side[d] with the majority on these issues. [He] once agreed [with the majority’s interpretation of the law]. But now the dissent calls for rehearing en banc. So what’s changed? . .
. The only change I’m aware of is that an armada of oil industry amici[—the industry for
which Judge Wiener had once worked—] now urges us to take this case en banc . . . .
[Judge Wiener] openly echoes amici’s themes—speaking on behalf of “[t]hose of us who
were born, bred, and educated in the ‘oil patch.’”
Id. at 801 (Ho, J., concurring) (citations omitted). If professional pedigree and personal upbringing
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illusory enterprise of seeking to divine the oxymoronic “collective intent” of
an assemblage of disparate legislators and an executive.46
A fidelity to judicial modesty through the practice of textualism, embodying the interpretive maxims discussed above, effectively eliminates the idea
that “prejudice” and “unfair prejudice” can have the same meaning.47 Indeed,
although initially counterintuitive, these two phrases are perhaps the most separate they could be because the construction of one clause as a modified version of another almost invariably means that one is a subset of the other.48 As
such, unlike synonyms, these two phrases demand some distinction.49 For
example, if all asphalt is black, then “black asphalt” doesn’t make sense. It’s
like “wet water.” As opposed to what? If all prejudice is “unfair,” then what’s
“unfair prejudice” in Rule 403?50
Consider Salisbury’s well-known, albeit often truncated, words on this
point from The Life and Death of King John:
Pem. This ‘once again,’ but that your highness pleased,
Was once superfluous; you were crown’d before,
And that high royalty was ne’er pluck’d off,
The faiths of men ne’er stainèd with revolt;
Fresh expectation troubled not the land With any long’d-for
change or better state.
imbued our unelected federal judiciary, or a subset thereof, with the legitimacy and authority to determine the lawfulness of legislation based upon a soothsayer-like determination of the law’s future negative repercussions, as well as a monk-like a priori knowledge of an unassailable normative code—
irrespective of both the role and actions of democratically elected legislators—then it seems likely that
courts would strike down far more laws than they do today, as there remain, no doubt, many highly
educated jurists who view their policy preferences superior to those of the elected officials who actually create law. Id. at 802. As Judge Ho appropriately noted: “If the industry [some of whom apparently were Judge Wiener’s former clients,] does not like that result, its complaint lies not with
Hewitt—or this court—but with Congress.” Id. at 797.
46. See id. at 800 (“The majority disavows . . . purposivist arguments (echoed by the dissent) . . . .”).
47. See discussion infra Section II.E.2.
48. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 930–33 (2013) (describing canons of statutory textual construction, including the noscitur a sociis
canon, ejusdem generis canon, and expressio unius canon); see also Phillip A. Rubin, War of the
Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries Consistent with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167,
171 n.30 (2010) (discussing “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on dictionaries in construing
statutes and constitutional provisions”).
49. See discussion infra Section II.E.2.
50. See infra Section II.D.
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Sal. Therefore, to be possest with double pomp,
To gard a title that was rich before,
To gild refinèd gold, to paint the lily,
To throw a perfume on the violet,
To smooth the ice, or add another hue
Unto the rainbow, or with taper-light
To seek the beauteous eye of heav'n to garnish,
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess.51
This concept is easily displayed in Venn diagram terms as:

UNFAIR
PREJUDICE

(ALL) PREJUDICE

Moreover, equating the subset with the whole results in the term “unfair”
in Rule 403 becoming meaningless.52 Thus, an attempt to save Rule 609 with
a tortured understanding of “prejudice” necessarily results in abandoning the
clear meaning of Rule 403.53 The alternative “solution,” as it were, would be
to have the same terms engender radically different meanings in the same
rules. This decidedly antitextualist approach—violating both of the core maxims discussed above—would effectively permit judges to impose their preferences on legislation, albeit likely under the claim that they are searching for

51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING JOHN act 4, sc. 2, l. 3–16.
52. See infra Section II.C.
53. See infra Section II.D.
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the ever-elusive Holy Grail of understanding—legislative intent.54
B. The Development of Character for Truthfulness Impeachment Through
Convictions
1. Early Law
At common law, both felons and those guilty of crimes of falsehood were
barred from testifying in court.55 Over time, many jurisdictions concluded it
beneficial to the administration of justice to have all possible witnesses testify
at trial and changed their laws to allow felons to testify—though these jurisdictions almost always followed this advancement with permitting opposing
parties to impeach witnesses’ character for truthfulness with prior convictions.56 Usually, the evidence was to be admitted in all circumstances, but
there were some exceptions.57 This trend was recognized and adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1918.58
This started to change, however, with a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
case in 1965.59 In Luck v. United States, the ironically named defendant was
arrested on charges of housebreaking and larceny.60 At trial, on cross-examination, the prosecution brought up Luck’s previous guilty plea to a grand larceny charge in order to impeach his credibility.61 Luck’s attorney objected
that this charge could not be admitted into evidence since Luck had been a
juvenile at the time.62 The trial court overruled the objection, and the prior

54. See infra Section II.D.
55. ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 3.4.1, at 128 (1st ed. 2015); see also Bellin, supra note 4, at
296 (discussing the historical roots of barring defendants from testifying because of past convictions);
Simmons, supra note 4, at 999 (“Historically, under the common law, a prior criminal conviction could
preclude a witness from testifying altogether.”).
56. Bellin, supra note 4, at 296–97; see also James McMahon, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1063, 1065 n.8 (1986) (discussing the balancing provisions regarding allowing prior convictions as evidence to impeach).
57. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 296; see also McMahon, supra note 56, at 1065 n.8.
58. See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) (finding government witness was not
disqualified from testifying because of his forgery conviction).
59. PARK & LININGER, supra note 55, at § 3.4.3.
60. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
61. Id. at 766.
62. Id.
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conviction was admitted as credibility evidence.63 On appeal, Luck argued
that this evidence should have been barred under the District of Columbia
Code, which, at the time, prevented previous convictions as a juvenile from
being used in court.64 However, as the circuit court noted, this section was
written for the juvenile court itself and not for the district court, where Luck
was tried.65 The court in Luck noted that there was no absolute bar at the
district court level on credibility evidence of a juvenile conviction.66 Instead,
this case was governed by the portion of the District of Columbia Code that
stated at that time “the conviction ‘may,’ as opposed to ‘shall,’ be admitted.”67
The court interpreted this to mean that each trial court must exercise its discretion as to whether the evidence should be admitted.68
The circuit court suggested a balancing test to determine whether previous convictions should be admitted as credibility evidence.69 In the court’s
estimation, trial court judges should weigh
the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above
all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for
truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s
story than to know of a prior conviction.70
The court held that in the case of Mr. Luck, it had no reason to question the
district judge’s exercise of discretion.71

63. Id.
64. Id. at 766–67; see also 16 D.C. CODE § 2308(d) (1963). This section of the code is quoted in
full in the Luck decision. 348 F.2d at 767 n.4.
65. Luck, 348 F.2d at 767.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 768 (quoting 14 D.C. CODE § 305 (1961)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 768–69.
70. Id. at 769 (footnote omitted).
71. Id.
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2. The Modern Rule
a. The Origin Story
In the years following Luck, many jurisdictions began to adopt similar
holdings.72 However, Congress soon intervened, passing legislation that overruled Luck, allowing in all felonies and crimen falsi73 as impeachment evidence.74 The Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence took this as a sign that Congress wanted character for truthfulness
evidence handled in this fashion in all federal cases, not just those in the District of Columbia.75 As such, when drafting proposed changes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the committee proposed Rule 609, with their draft specifying that all felony convictions for a criminal defendant could be admitted as
character for truthfulness evidence.76
Congress, however, did not accept this version of Rule 609.77 The House
felt that the proposed rule was too broad, instead passing a version that barred
impeachment based on prior convictions except those involving crimes of
falsehood.78 The Senate disagreed with the House, passing a version not
72. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 609[03], at 609–60 n.2 (1981) (collecting
cases)).
73. See, e.g., PARK & LININGER, supra note 55, § 3.4.1 (“‘Crimen falsi’ referred to crimes of fraud
and deceit, as well as crimes that generally fell under the category of obstruction of justice.”); HON.
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE PRACTICE GUIDE § 15.04(1)(b)(i)(B) (2020) (“Historically, offenses classified as crim[en] falsi have included only those crimes in which the ultimate
criminal act was itself an act of deceit.”).
74. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059; see D.C. CODE § 14-305(b)(1) (emphasis added) (“[F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal
offense shall be admitted . . . if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted[] or (B) involved dishonesty or false
statement (regardless of punishment).”); see also Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence:
Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2300–01 (1994) (discussing the timeline of the stages of development of Rule 609).
75. Bellin, supra note 4, at 305–06; see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059.
76. Bellin, supra note 4, at 305 (“Proposed Rule 609 directed trial courts to admit convictions for
all crimes ‘punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year’ (i.e., felonies) as well as all
crimes (felony or misdemeanor) involving ‘dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment’
for ‘the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness.’”); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059
(detailing the legislative history of Rule 609).
77. Bellin, supra note 4, at 306 (explaining Congress’s change of opinion regarding this draft of
Rule 609).
78. Id.; see also Gold, supra note 74, at 2302–04 (noting the debate in the House over which convictions would be admissible).
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restricted to crimen falsi convictions.79 In conference, the two houses compromised—passing a version that automatically admitted prior convictions for
crimes of falsehood and set up a balancing test for felonies, requiring admission of the evidence if the “probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.”80 The legislative history shows
that the word “unfair,” which was included in the drafts of the rule from the
Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence and
early drafts in the House, was dropped by the Senate and was not reintroduced
in conference committee.81
b. The Circuitous Path
The legislative process began when Representative William L. Hungate
(D-MO) introduced the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence’s proposed draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the House of Representatives
on March 12, 1973.82 This original version, drafted to mirror Congress’s rejection of the Luck case,83 read in relevant part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement
regardless of the punishment.84
As one can see, this first version did not contain any sort of balancing test,
letting in all felonies and crimen falsi.85 Thus, there was no cause to reference
prejudice, unfair or otherwise, as all convictions came in.86
The House referred the bill to the House Committee on the Judiciary,

79. Bellin, supra note 4, at 306.
80. Id. at 306–07; see also Simmons, supra note 4, at 1000 (explaining the path to compromise
taken by the House and the Senate).
81. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059–62.
82. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. (1973).
83. 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (1974) (statement of John L. McClellan); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d
at 1059 (providing historical context of the debates and drafts of Rule 609).
84. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. (1973).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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which in turn referred the bill to its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.87 The
Subcommittee rejected the blanket admission of all felonies, opting instead
for a balancing test for those convictions while preserving the automatic admission of crimen falsi.88 The Subcommittee’s version, therefore, read:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, unless the court determines that
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value
of the evidence of the conviction[] or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement.89
Thus, the modifier “unfair” entered Rule 609’s lexicon through the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.90 This version of the rule used the “outweighs” language in reference to probativeness present to this day in the rule,
rather than Rule 403’s “substantially” outweighs.91
When the bill went to the full Judiciary Committee, legislators further
restricted it.92 The Committee amended Rule 609 so that only convictions for
crimen falsi were admissible for impeachment evidence.93 The Committee
felt that “the danger of unfair prejudice . . . and the deterrent effect upon an
accused who might wish to testify” was so great that impeachment evidence
should be limited to crimes “bearing directly on credibility, [i.e.], crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.”94 Of course, there’s logic in this position, as a prior conviction inherently implicating lying bears far more upon a
witness’s overall character for truthfulness than does a felony not relating to,
well, truthfulness.95
When the bill went to the full House of Representatives, several
87. H.R REP. NO. 93-650, at 2 (1973); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059–60 (detailing the
debates and revisions between House committees over Rule 609).
88. H.R REP. No. 93-650 at 11; see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1059–60; Gold, supra note 74, at
2301–02.
89. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11.
90. Id. (noting the inclusion of the modifier “unfair”).
91. See generally FED. R. EVID. 609; FED. R. EVID. 403.
92. See Gold, supra note 74, at 2302–03.
93. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11 (1973); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1060.
94. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11.
95. See McMahon, supra note 56, at 1065–66 (exploring the connection between prior convictions
and a witness’s veracity).
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legislators proposed additional amendments.96 Representative Lawrence Hogan (R-MD) proposed reverting back to the Advisory Committee’s version,
automatically admitting all felonies and crimen falsi for impeachment.97 Representative Henry P. Smith (R-NY) proposed an alternative: reverting back to
the balancing test from the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice version, including the “unfair prejudice” language.98 After significant debate, the House rejected both ideas and sent to the Senate the version that only allowed for admitting crimen falsi to impeach credibility.99
The Senate then referred the bill to its own Committee on the Judiciary.100
The Committee amended the bill, keeping the prohibition on admitting noncrimen falsi felony convictions for defendants themselves but allowing them
to be introduced against all other witnesses as long as “the probative value of
such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”101 The Committee reasoned
that this would allow in more relevant evidence for other witnesses, while still
affording extra protections to criminal defendants.102 The Committee statement, however, referenced “the danger of unfair prejudice [as being] far
greater when the accused, as opposed to other witnesses, testifies.”103
Nevertheless, this was not the final Senate version of Rule 609.104 When
the bill went to the full Senate, Senator John L. McClellan (D-AR) proposed
an amendment to strip the balancing test completely and revert back to the
version from the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Evidence, allowing in all felonies and crimen falsi for all witnesses, including
the accused.105 In his testimony rejecting a balancing test, Senator McClellan
used the term “unfair prejudice” in reference to the Senate Judiciary Committee version of the bill, despite the fact that the bill only contained the term
“prejudicial effect.”106 Senator McClellan said: “[T]he reasoning behind the
rule now being proposed . . . is based upon the erroneous belief that the use of
prior convictions to impeach a witness should be restricted in order to avoid
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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See Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1060–61.
120 CONG. REC. 2376–77 (1974) (remarks of Lawrence Hogan).
Id. at 2377–78 (statement of Henry P. Smith).
Id. at 2381; see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1060.
S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 1 (1974).
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1060.
120 CONG. REC. 37,075–76 (1974).
Id. (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan).
Id. at 37,076.
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alleged unfair prejudice to defendants.”107 The Senator argued, instead, that
the jury should have all possible evidence bearing on credibility, and jury instructions would provide sufficient protection for criminal defendants.108
Some of those opposed to Senator McClellan’s amendment also conflated
unfair prejudice with prejudice.109 In a memorandum placed into the Senate
Record, Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) argued for the Senate Judiciary Committee version since “[i]t concentrates on the crucial question of unfair prejudice
to the defendant if he takes the stand.”110 He also argued that “[b]oth the
Common Law rule111 and the Luck rule112 simply provide inadequate protection against this unfair prejudice to a defendant. In the case of a witness, not
the defendant himself, the prejudice danger is still there, but [it is] less devastating.”113
The first vote on Senator McClellan’s amendment ended in a tie.114 After
a successful motion to reconsider the amendment, the final count was thirtyeight for and thirty-three against.115 With that, the final Senate version of Rule
609 again dropped the balancing test in favor of allowing all prior felonies
and crimen falsi convictions as impeachment evidence.116 After passing
through the Senate, the bill went to conference committee, for the two houses
to create a single bill.117 The conference committee accepted the Senate wording but, critically, again reintroduced a balancing test, which also did not include “unfair.”118 This became the final version of the bill.119 Thus, we see
that “prejudice” rather than “unfair prejudice” was affirmatively adopted on
several discrete occasions in separate congressional committee, Senate, and
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. 120 CONG. REC. 37,078 (1974) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. The common law rule barred all felons from testifying. Id.
112. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir., 1965) (using a factor balancing test
weighing “the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age and circumstances
of the defendant, and[] above all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth in a
particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s story than to know of a prior conviction”).
113. 120 CONG. REC. 37,078 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 37,080.
115. Id. at 37,083.
116. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Simmons, supra note
4, at 1000.
117. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 1 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1061.
118. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9 (1974); see also Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1061.
119. See 120 CONG. REC. 40,069–70, 40,890–97 (1974).
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House votes.120 Whatever “motivated” this change (more below), it was neither last minute nor not subject to significant ratification thereafter.121
This version stated that a crimen falsi conviction would be admissible
automatically, but any other felony would only be admitted when “the court
determines that the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant.”122 The conference committee stated that crimen falsi
were “peculiarly probative” and should be admitted automatically.123 It also
wrote that the danger of prejudice against witnesses other than the defendant
did not outweigh the need for the jury to have as much evidence as possible;
this evidence was automatically admissible without any balancing test.124 The
conference committee said that prior conviction evidence “should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of
the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of
his prior criminal record.”125
The Senate passed the bill with no further debate.126 There was some
debate over Rule 609 in the House, but the overwhelming support was in favor
of the conference committee’s version.127 In this debate, no legislator used
the term “unfair prejudice,” sticking with “prejudice” or “prejudicial effect.”128 After the Senate passed the bill, President Gerald Ford signed it into
law.129
As originally enacted, the balancing test of Rule 609 only weighed the
“prejudicial effect to the defendant.”130 The incorporation of Rule 403’s balancing test for offering prior convictions against all other witnesses was yet
to be adopted.131 Courts and academics were split over the meaning of the

120. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 999–1002.
121. Id.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9.
123. Id.
124. Id. This was later amended. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9–10.
126. 120 CONG. REC. 40,069–70 (1974).
127. Id. at 40,480, 40,891, 40,893–95.
128. Id.
129. Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/housebill/5463/all-info (providing history of actions taken for H.R.5463 during the 93rd Congress (1973–
1974)).
130. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9 (emphasis added).
131. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 1000–01.
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word “defendant.”132 The main ambiguity was whether the word referred to
any defendant or only criminal defendants—as defendant can be used to mean
either, depending on the context.133 The Supreme Court wrestled with this
ambiguity in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.134
In Green, the petitioner was a prisoner who had been employed at a local
carwash through a work release program.135 While at work, his right arm was
torn off by a rotating drum on one of the dryers.136 He filed a products liability
tort claim against respondent, Bock Laundry Machine Co.137 When Green
took the stand at trial, Bock introduced evidence of Green’s felony convictions for burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary as credibility impeachment evidence.138 Green filed a pretrial motion to exclude this evidence,
claiming the benefit of Rule 609’s balancing test notwithstanding that he was
a plaintiff; the district court denied his motion.139 The jury ultimately found
for Bock, and upon Green’s appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.140
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, began by acknowledging the textual ambiguity in Rule 609.141 He noted three different interpretations of the
word “defendant” taken by lower courts.142 Oddly, these lower-court interpretations did not include one of the obvious choices: defendants in both criminal and civil cases.143 Justice Stevens described that some courts had held
that the word meant only criminal defendants, others that it meant any party
offering a witness, and others said that it referred to any witness, whether or
not a party to the suit.144
Justice Stevens held that reading Rule 609 to apply to both civil and
132. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 507–08, 511 (1983).
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 506.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 845 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1988)).
141. Id. at 508; see also id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the question before the Court
regarding the meaning of “defendant”).
142. Id. at 511 (majority opinion).
143. Id. at 509.
144. Id. at 511. “The word might be interpreted to encompass all witnesses, civil and criminal,
parties or not. It might be read to connote any party offering a witness, in which event Rule 609(a)(1)'s
balance would apply to civil, as well as criminal, cases. Finally, ‘defendant’ may refer only to the
defendant in a criminal case.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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criminal defendants, and only to them, would create an “absurd” result.145 He
reasoned that, unlike in criminal cases, the designation of one party as “defendant” or “plaintiff” in a civil case “is often happenstance based on which
party filed first or on the nature of the suit.”146
Moreover, civil parties are not constitutionally protected against self-incrimination and are very likely to be compelled to the stand at trial.147 In light
of this, granting civil defendants the benefit of a balancing test on prior convictions while automatically admitting the same kind of evidence against a
civil plaintiff would be a violation of the due process rights of plaintiffs.148
Having concluded that exclusively applying Rule 609’s balancing test to
civil and criminal defendants would be unacceptable based upon a combination of constitutional concerns and his purposivist judicial preferences, Justice
Stevens delved into the legislative history of Rule 609 in order to divine a
more acceptable meaning for the word “defendant.”149 He noted that Congress, in its final draft of the rule, rejected earlier versions that explicitly applied Rule 609’s prejudicial effect balancing test to all parties offering witnesses.150 Besides this, Justice Stevens noted that there were several
comments by legislators in debate and in committee reports indicating that
they only envisioned Rule 609 applying to criminal defendants.151 From this
legislative history, Justice Stevens held that Congress only intended Rule
609’s balancing test to apply to criminal defendants.152
This left open the question of whether Rule 403’s balancing test could be
applied to the prior convictions of other witnesses.153 Justice Stevens dealt
with this argument fairly quickly.154 He noted that general rules, like Rule
403, only apply if a more specific rule does not preempt them.155 In this case,
Rule 609 is a more specific rule, stating that, absent the applicability of Rule
609’s own balancing test (now only relevant to criminal defendants), prior
145. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 510.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 509–10.
149. Id. at 511–21. This paper has already covered Rule 609’s history in detail, so it will not be
recounted again here. See supra Section II.B.
150. Green, 490 U.S. at 523–24.
151. Id. at 520–21; see also id. at 521 n.26.
152. Id. at 523–24.
153. Id. at 524.
154. Id. at 524–26.
155. Id. (citing D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
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felony convictions “shall be admitted.”156 This language precludes the use of
a Rule 403 balancing test on prior convictions for impeachment evidence, he
held.157 This meant that a prior conviction could only be excluded if it prejudiced a criminal defendant; a prior conviction of any party in a civil trial or of
a prosecution witness would be admitted automatically regardless of prejudice.158
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion.159 Though he agreed
with the Court’s ruling, he felt that Justice Stevens’s method of statutory interpretation was deeply flawed.160 While Justice Scalia did not reject the usefulness of legislative history entirely, he criticized Justice Stevens’s heavy reliance upon it.161 Justice Scalia instead advocated for the originalist method
of statutory interpretation, stating that:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown
to have been understood by a larger handful of the [m]embers of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning
is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and
thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention
the citizens subject to it)[] and (2) most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be
integrated . . . . I would not permit any of the historical and
legislative material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these
factors suggest.162
Using this framework, Justice Scalia first concluded that the word “defendant” in Rule 609 could not apply to both civil and criminal defendants on
constitutional grounds.163 He reasoned, very similarly to Justice Stevens, that
allowing civil defendants the benefit of Rule 609’s balancing test, while
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 525–26 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526–27.
See id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 527–29.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528–29.
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denying all balancing to civil plaintiffs, was probably unconstitutional.164 Justice Scalia concluded that understanding “defendant” as criminal defendant
was one common legal understanding of “defendant,” while the others
adopted by lower courts would require the Court to force “defendant” to refer
to “prosecutor” or “plaintiff,” definitions that the word and text “simply will
not bear.”165 Justice Scalia also noted that the Rules of Evidence overall grant
special protections to criminal defendants.166 Interpreting Rule 609 to apply
only to criminal defendants would thus be consistent with its “surrounding
body of law.”167 Justice Scalia felt it important to emphasize that legislative
history is not law; the statutory language as finally enacted by Congress is.168
In his view, legislative history should only be examined as supplemental to
the text of the law.169
The Supreme Court Advisory Committee proposed a substantial amendment to Rule 609 in 1990.170 This amendment kept the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test for criminal defendants but stated that prior felony convictions of
all other witnesses “must be admitted, subject to Rule 403.”171 Crimes of
falsehood remained automatically admissible against all witnesses.172 Congress made no changes to the Committee’s proposed amendment and allowed
it to become law.173 This is how Rule 609’s balancing test reads today.174
The Advisory Committee explained that the 1990 amendment “reflect[ed]
the view that it is desirable to protect all litigants from the unfair use of prior
164. Id. at 527–29.
165. Id. at 529.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 528–29.
168. Id. at 529–30.
169. Id.
170. Simmons, supra note 4, at 1001.
171. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also Gold, supra note 74, at 2309.
172. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s notes on 1990 Amendment; see also Gold, supra note
74, at 2309.
173. Gold, supra note 74, at 2309. Gold states, regarding Rule 609:
[T]he Supreme Court’s version was submitted with the understanding that it would become
effective December 1, 1990[,] unless Congress provided otherwise. Without any public
debate, Congress made no effort to defer the effective date of the amendment even though
the amendment made important changes to a law over which Congress had waged a vigorous and protracted struggle less than a generation before.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
174. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 1001. While the Advisory Committee did substantively amend
Rule 609 again in 2006, this amendment left the balancing test alone, focusing instead on crimes of
falsehood automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Id.
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convictions.”175 The amendment addressed the textual ambiguity that the
Green Court dealt with, keeping Rule 609’s heightened balancing test for
criminal defendants, while applying Rule 403’s balancing test to the convictions of all other witnesses.176 It also clarified the procedure regarding prior
convictions of a criminal defense witness other than the accused.177
The Committee note repeatedly referenced Rule 609’s protection against
“unfair” or “undu[e]” prejudice, notwithstanding the language to the contrary.178 It also stated that the amendment would extend Rule 609’s protection
against “unfair impeachment” to witnesses other than the accused through its
incorporation of Rule 403, which does seek to limit unfair prejudice.179 But
then, perhaps highlighting the danger of granting too much weight to committee notes—often written by staff—and other oft-asserted legislative history,
the Committee substituted Rule 609’s “prejudicial effect” language into its
discussion of Rule 403, stating: “Rule 403 . . . provides that evidence shall not
be excluded unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative
value,”180 notwithstanding, of course, that Rule 403 critically does contain the
term “unfair.”181
C. Euclidean Proof of the Inoperability of Rule 609 to Criminal Defendants
In addition to the two substantive differences between balancing tests applicable to Rule 403 and Rule 609 discussed so far, two other subsidiary differences compound the difficulty in comparing the tests.
First, as thoroughly discussed, the two substantive differences between
the balancing tests present as follows: Rule 403 allows courts to exclude evidence if the “probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice.”182 Rule 609’s internal test only refers to “prejudicial effect,” and that
must merely “outweigh[]” probativeness to exclude the evidence, rather than
“substantially outweigh[].”183

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s notes on 1990 amendment.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 403.
FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 609; FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Greenaway, supra note 26, at 14.
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In addition, a subsidiary difference reveals itself when examining the “direction” of the two equations that represent the respective balancing tests.
Rule 609 is written in the positive, describing what must be included, and Rule
403 is written in the negative, describing what may be excluded.184 So, we
must rationalize these equations to compare them.185 Under the comparison
method for solving algebraic equations, we reorder equations that we’re comparing to isolate the same variables.186
Let’s look at the balancing tests in mathematical terms, where
T = probaTiveness
J = preJudice
uJ = unfair prejudice
fJ = fair prejudice
J = uJ + fJ
>> = substantially greater than187
Rule 403 considers evidence admissible unless uJ >> T.188
Rule 609 (for criminal defendants) requires admission if T > J.189
Given that these two equations are presented in different directions, we
need to reorder them.190 Putting the equations in the same direction produces
the following:
Rule 403 considers evidence admissible unless uJ >> T.
Rule 609 (for criminal defendants) requires admission unless J ≥ T.

184. FED. R. EVID. 609; FED. R. EVID. 403.
185. See The Difference Between Solving an Equation and Solving an Inequality, TUTAPOINT.COM,
https://www.tutapoint.com/knowledge-center/view/the-differencebetween-solving-an-equationand-solving-an-inequality (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (explaining that since “unless” is an exclusionary term and “if” is an inclusive term, they operate as negative and positive; therefore, rationalizing
the variables leads to changing the inequality signs).
186. See id.; Isolating a Variable, BRILLIANT, https://brilliant.org/wiki/change-the- subject-of-aformula/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (describing the process of isolating a variable).
187. See FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 609.
188. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
189. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
190. See The Difference Between Solving an Equation and Solving an Inequality, supra note 185;
Isolating a Variable, supra note 186.
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Now that these equations are reduced, we can easily see that the Rule 609
balancing test is much more exclusionary than that of Rule 403.191 Rule 403
has a strong bias towards admissibility.192 Rule 609 does not.193 Rule 609’s
internal test is much more protective towards criminal defendants.194
Next, what is considered in determining “probativeness” differs between
the two rules.195 Both rules evaluate the probativeness of evidence in relation
to why it’s offered.196 For Rule 403, the evidence can be directly offered towards the overarching issue of liability or guilt or towards some subsidiary
issue.197 In contrast, Rule 609, on its terms, only considers probativeness as
to the issue of truthfulness of the witness.198
Prejudicial information is anything that negatively bears on a party.199 For
an example outside the context of Rule 609, a video of a defendant driving
through a red light at a high speed is undoubtedly prejudicial to his claim that
he didn’t commit negligent homicide.200 Likely, it’s highly prejudicial.201 Of
course, it’s also highly probative, as it shows the defendant actually committing the crime.202 No longer will he have a realistic chance of arguing that the

191. See generally Aviva Orenstein, Insisting That Judges Employ a Balancing Test Before Admitting the Accused’s Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1291,
1293 (2010) (“Rule 403 is a balancing test applied by the judge as a limited rule of exclusion, favoring
admission of evidence; Rule 609, by contrast, is more restrictive.”).
192. See Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An Examination of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony Admissibility in the Federal Circuit Courts, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 765, 777–78 (2011) (“Rule 403 is meant to be a liberal rule . . . . Congress intended that
judges would invoke this ‘drastic remedy’ infrequently and only when absolutely necessary.”).
193. See Orenstein, supra note 191, at 1293–94.
194. See id.
195. Compare FED. R. EVID. 403 (containing no limiting language on applicability), with FED. R.
EVID. 609 (“The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence
of a criminal conviction.”), and 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEISTEIN’S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.02[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008).
196. FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 609.
197. See FED. R. EVID. 401. For purposes of Rule 403, evidence is considered “relevant” if it helps
to determine if any consequential fact is more or less probable. Id.
198. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (“The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction.”); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 195.
199. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 163 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. RodriguezEstrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) (“By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial . . . .”);
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 99 (1st Cir. 2002)).
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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crime didn’t occur or that he wasn’t its perpetrator.203 Indeed, the evidence
very well might be more prejudicial than probative, in that juries give great
weight to video evidence these days, and a jury might not look beyond it for
exculpatory evidence or defenses.204 I doubt many, if any, judges would exclude it under Rule 403’s “unfair prejudice” standard.205 And that is correct,
as the purpose of Rule 403 isn’t to create a Harrison Bergeron-like206 balance
between the parties but, rather, to ensure that juries don’t overweigh certain
evidence207 or otherwise improperly consider evidence (e.g., wrongly viewing
as substantive evidence prior inconsistent statements offered under Rule 613
of the Federal Rules of Evidence).208
Recall that the reason a witness’s prior convictions are admitted under
203. Id.
204. See Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Neal Feigenson & Tom Tyler, In the Eyes of the Law: Perception Versus Reality in Appraisals of Video Evidence, 24 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 93, 97 (2018)
(analyzing how juries view video evidence).
205. See Tse, 375 F.3d at 163 (“[W]hile a court must weigh all potential ‘prejudicial effect’ to the
defendant when deciding whether to admit a prior conviction of the accused, it must weigh only the
kind of prejudice that can be deemed ‘unfair’ . . . .”).
206. See generally Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in ANIMAL FARM AND RELATED
READINGS 130 (1997) (“The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only
equal before God and the law. They were equal every which way.”); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting from K. Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in
ANIMAL FARM AND RELATED READINGS, 129 (1997)).
207. See Greenaway, supra note 26 (giving support and a factual scenario for the above assertion).
208. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613. Non-substantive evidence of prior inconsistent statements is
solely offered to show that a witness has said something contrary to his current testimony. John A.
Bourdeau, Annotation, Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment of Testimony of Witnesses Under Rule 613, Federal Rules of Evidence, 152 A.L.R. FED. 375 § 3 (1999). It is offered not
to attack the witness’s general character for truthfulness but, rather, to show that on the particular
topic, the witness’s testimony should not be trusted. Id. When offered for this limited basis, the socalled “impeachment” evidence may not be considered by the jury for a purpose beyond undermining
the believability of the witness’s specific testimony. See, e.g., State v. Spadafore, 159 W. Va 236, 246
(1975) (“The orthodox rule with regard to prior inconsistent statements is that such statements cannot
be accorded any value as substantive evidence.”). For example, if a witness testifies that the traffic
light at the scene of an accident was red but previously told his neighbor that the same light was green,
the jury is permitted to consider the neighbor’s testimony recounting the prior witness’s statement
only to undermine the reliability of the testimony that the light was red. Id. However, the jury (and
judge on a directed verdict motion) may not use the neighbor’s statement as substantive evidence that
the light was, in fact, green. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 435–44 (3d ed. 2013) (excerpting United
States v. Barret, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976)). The neighbor’s testimony should be understood only
as saying that the prior witness previously said something inconsistent with his current testimony, but
the jury may not consider what that inconsistency is. Id. Of course, juries (no less law students,
judges, and lawyers) often have considerable difficulty parsing this remarkably fine distinction. See
Joel V. Williamson, Evidence--Prior Inconsistent Statements--Court Reverses Long Line of Decisions,
58 KY. L.J. 112, 115 (1969).
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Rule 609 is to “attack[] [the] witness’s character for truthfulness.”209 Thus,
when the Rule speaks of the probative value of a prior conviction, it’s addressing how probative that felony is of the witness’s penchant for telling the
truth.210 It’s hard to say what felony evidence is particularly probative of
truthfulness beyond the separate category of crimes of dishonesty (which we
are not concerned about here because they are automatically admitted under a
different section of Rule 609).211 Crimes of brute violence are less probative
of character for truthfulness.212 Perhaps a complex theft case that’s not technically a crime of dishonesty would qualify as particularly probative of truthfulness.213 Even if that past crime is highly probative, however, it’s also surely
just as prejudicial. And here’s the rub: it’s likely more prejudicial than probative.214 Understanding why is crucial in evaluating whether the absence of
the “unfairness” term is critical to understanding the meaning of the rule.215
While evidence of lack of truthfulness demonstrated through a felony
conviction provides the jury with the very insight Rule 609 seeks to offer, it
doesn’t tell us a lot about the defendant’s actual truthfulness in the instant
case.216 Even the best non-crime-of-dishonesty felony evidence on character
for truthfulness is only somewhat telling, i.e., probative, of truthfulness.217 So,
what we view as the “best” Rule 609 non-crime-of-dishonesty felony evidence maxes out on a probativeness scale at, say, eight out of ten due to the
inherent disconnect—i.e., lack of perfect correlation—between a witness’s

209. FED. R. EVID. 609.
210. PARK & LININGER, supra note 55, at § 3.1; see also Bellin, supra note 4, at 310 n.80.
211. See Tarleton David Williams, Jr., Witness Impeachment by Evidence of Prior Felony Convictions: The Time Has Come for the Federal Rules of Evidence To Put on the New Man and Forgive the
Felon, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 893, 895 (1992) (suggesting revisions to Rule 609 regarding “non-dishonesty
felony convictions”); FED. R. EVID. 609.
212. PARK & LININGER, supra note 55, at § 3.4.4.1.1.1 (discussing the impeachment value of the
prior crime).
213. See People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126, 1132 (Colo. 2008) (en banc) (concluding that “theft is
probative of truthfulness or dishonesty”).
214. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 310 (“[F]or the vast run of criminal convictions, the probative value
of a conviction as impeachment is minimal.”).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Tse, 375 F.3 148, 163 (explaining why the lack of the “unfairness”
term in Rule 609 creates a heightened standard for admission of evidence).
216. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 292. “Commentators have long criticized the practice of impeaching testifying defendants with prior convictions, citing the questionable relevance of past crimes to
witness credibility . . . .” Id.
217. Segovia, 196 P.3d at 1132 (“We note that a prior act of shoplifting does not always mean a
witness will testify untruthfully.”).
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actual character for truthfulness and his prior felony conviction.218 But that
non-crime-of-dishonesty felony evidence on character for truthfulness is more
prejudicial because the level of overall prejudice (without any modifier), i.e.,
total harm to the defendant, should, as a matter of logic, be at least as strong
as its probativeness to the prosecution plus whatever unfair weight that a jury
gives to the character evidence by improperly concluding criminal propensity
(rather than propensity towards untruthfulness).219 And while there may be
some other unfair prejudice to consider, the archetype of unfair prejudice in
the context of Rule 609 evidence is that recognized in Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (Rule 404).220
In a remarkable emphasis found nowhere else in the Federal Rules of Evidence, in fact, Rule 404 repeats its core philosophical concept twice—once
in Rule 404(a) and again in 404(b)—stating (with only slight differences in
wording): “Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.”221 The idea is simple: parties
shouldn’t be judged based on their general character—irrespective of how bad
they are, parties should be evaluated on whether they actually engaged in the
wrongdoing at issue.222 Indeed, even though one’s bad character in many instances increases the odds that the individual engaged in the particular bad
behavior under review, that likelihood evidence (i.e., propensity evidence) is
beyond the scope of evaluation by the trier of fact because of the fear that such
evidence will be overweighed—i.e., unfairly considered.223 “[When] prior
convictions are used to impeach the testifying defendant, [he] faces a unique
risk of prejudice—[i.e.], the danger that convictions [otherwise] excluded
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 4, at 291 (beginning article by explaining how juries may improperly consider prior convictions as an indication of criminal propensity).
220. FED. R. EVID. 404 (“Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character.”).
221. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
222. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s notes on the 1972 proposed rules.
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the particular
occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad
man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows
actually happened.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
223. Id.

92

[Vol. 49: 63, 2022]

The “Unfairness” Proof
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

under [Fed. Rule] 404 will be misused by a jury as propensity evidence despite
their introduction solely for impeachment purposes.”224
Understanding these considerations leading to the prejudice calculation is
essential. Take, for example, the evidence of guilt discussed above: video
evidence.225 The value of its probativeness is equal to its fair prejudice.226
That is, the jury is aptly informed of the defendant’s wrongdoing (probativeness) at least at the same level that the defendant is viewed as guilty (prejudiced) in the eyes of the jury.227 The jury might overweigh the evidence because video evidence can be overly convincing.228 So, it might be more
prejudicial overall than probative.229
Now, contemplate how helpful (probative) non-crime-of-dishonesty felony evidence is to a jury on the issue of character for truthfulness. The answer
is: kind of because, as discussed, a felony only somewhat enlightens on actual
character for truthfulness. In contrast, the felony conviction is likely held
against (prejudices) the defendant in two ways—one legitimate (fair) and one
illegitimate (unfair).230 The fair prejudice is necessarily the mirror of the probativeness. As much as the jury is informed as to the defendant’s untruthfulness by the prior felony (i.e., probativeness), the jury also holds that negative
implication on character for truthfulness against the defendant (i.e., prejudice). This is the inherent symmetry, or “normal force” in physics terms, of
probativeness and fair prejudice.231 This alone entirely prohibits the introduction of the Rule 609 evidence against the defendant if Rule 609 is read as
written, as Rule 609 requires the probativeness of the evidence to outweigh

224. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s notes on 1990 Amendment; see also United States v.
Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281–85 (3d Cir. 2014) (giving a good analysis of how evidence excluded by
Rule 404 could be misused as propensity evidence); id. at 286 (discussing the danger of admitting
convictions under Rule 609 that are similar to the crime charged and quoting 28 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6134, at 253: “[T]he danger
of unfair prejudice is enhanced if the witness is the accused and the crime was similar to the crime
now charged[] since this increases the risk that the jury will draw an impermissible inference under
Rule 404(a).”).
225. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.
228. See Granot et al., supra note 204.
229. See id.
230. See infra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
231. See United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) (“By design, all
evidence is meant to be prejudicial . . . .”).
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the prejudice.232
In addition, there is almost always some unfair prejudice to a defendant
in offering a prior felony conviction for a jury to consider in evaluating character for truthfulness because of the inherent risk that the jury will engage in
improper propensity reasoning prohibited by Rule 404.233 As recognized
therein, juries are at least somewhat more likely to conclude, inter alia, that a
defendant is currently guilty simply because he committed a prior felony.234
So, the enacted language of Rule 609 invariably leads to the exclusion of all
felony evidence against a criminal defendant because the Rule 609 evidence
is less probative than it is prejudicial.235 As such, the rule becomes nugatory.
To be clear, the evidence is not more unfairly prejudicial than it is probative,
as that measure removes the fair prejudice that inherently mirrors the probativeness (which is intrinsically fair).236 Consider this in the following mathematical analysis.237
Recall the terms:
T = probaTiveness
J = preJudice
uJ = unfair prejudice
fJ = fair prejudice
J = uJ + fJ
>> = substantially greater

232. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).
233. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Rule 404(a) provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s character trait is
not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character
or trait.” Id.
234. Id. Rule 404(b), however, makes clear that the same evidence is admissible for other purposes,
such as in Rule 609. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
235. FED. R. EVID. 609. Compare Bellin, supra note 4, at 312 (explaining Congress’s choice of
language in Rule 609 places probative value and prejudice “on equal footing in the relative balance”),
with supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
236. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 310–11.
237. See discussion of mathematical proof supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text.
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Under Rule 403:
The evidence is admissible unless:
uJ >> T238
Corollaries to this rule are:
The evidence is admissible if:
T > J (which can also be written as T > uJ + fJ)
and
T = J (which also can be written as T = uJ + fJ)
And the most important corollary is the conclusion that:
The evidence is admissible if:
T = uJ239
Under Rule 609 with unfair read into the language, we see a similar—
albeit not identical—set of equations:
Admit unless:
uJ > T240
Corollaries to this rule are:
The evidence is admissible if:
T > J (which can also be written as T > uJ + fJ)
T = J (which also can be written as T = uJ + fJ)
But the important distinction with Rule 609, for a criminal defendant—
the subject of discussion here—is:
The evidence is inadmissible if:

238. FED. R. EVID. 403.
239. See discussion supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text.
240. FED. R. EVID. 609.
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T = uJ241
Under Rule 609 without unfair read into the language, we see an entirely
different set of equations:
Admit unless:
J ≥ T242
As discussed, however, the following equation should always be true: T
= fJ because the probativeness of the prior conviction on character for truthfulness should equal the fair prejudice it causes the defendant in terms of how
much the jury discounts the value of the defendant’s testimony.243
Given that T = fJ, then J ≥ T.
Thus, any prior conviction is automatically excluded under Rule 609 due
to the lack of “unfair” modifying “prejudice.”
D. How “Prejudice” Is Interpreted by the Courts
Most jurisdictions apply Rule 609 as if “prejudicial effect” is the same as
“unfair prejudice,” thereby ignoring the express language of the statute.244 Of
course, even when courts treat Rule 609’s “prejudicial effect” language as if
it means “unfair prejudice,” they recognize that their version of Rule 609 still
provides greater protection for criminal defendants than Rule 403, as discussed above.245
1. Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits
In United States v. Caldwell, the defendant was on trial for possession of
a firearm as a felon.246 At trial, Caldwell took the stand and stated that the
gun was not his.247 The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of

241. FED. R. EVID. 609.
242. Id.
243. See discussion supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
244. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 239 (stating the federal courts’ approach to Rule 609 is “patently
inconsistent” with the language of Rule 609 and congressional intent).
245. United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 286–89 (3d Cir. 2014).
246. Id. at 271.
247. Id. at 272. Caldwell took the stand at his first trial, which ended in a mistrial when the jury did
not reach a verdict, as did his second, on which this appeal is based. Id.
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Caldwell’s two prior convictions for unlawful firearms possession.248 They
argued that these prior convictions were admissible either under Rule 404 “to
show ‘knowledge and absence of mistake or accident,’” or under Rule 609 as
impeachment evidence.249 Sadly for anyone with an understanding of, or fidelity to, Rule 404, the district court admitted the evidence thereunder—not a
rare enough evidentiary blunder by a district court judge.250 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit aptly overturned the admission under Rule 404.251 In
deciding the Rule 609 issue, the court correctly quoted Rule 609’s “prejudicial
effect language.”252 However, it later uncritically cited sources using the “unfair prejudice” language.253
Despite treating Rule 609 as if “prejudicial effect” and “unfair prejudice”
are interchangeable, the court correctly recognized that even the incorrect
reading of Rule 609 provides a higher bar to admission of evidence than Rule
403.254 After quoting the text of Rule 609, the court stated the following:
This reflects a heightened balancing test and a reversal of the
standard for admission under Rule 403. Commentators have
observed that structuring the balancing in this manner creates a “predisposition toward exclusion. An exception is
made only where the prosecution shows that the evidence
makes a tangible contribution to the evaluation of credibility
and that the usual high risk of unfair prejudice is not present.”255
The Second Circuit treats Rule 609 in much the same way. In United
States v. Mustafa, for example, the Second Circuit quoted directly from Rule
609, including the “prejudicial effect” language.256 It then uncritically noted
that the lower court found “that the probative value of Mustafa’s United

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
Id. at 286.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR
JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6134, at 268 (2d ed. 2012)).
256. United States v. Mustafa, 753 Fed. Appx. 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Kingdom convictions outweighed their potential for unfair prejudice.”257 The
Second Circuit adopted the lower court’s reasoning with no correction.258
Further, in United States v. Brown,259 a district court for the Second Circuit used the “prejudicial effect” language of Rule 609 occasionally but repeatedly referenced “unfair prejudice.”260 For example, the court decided to
bar admission of one of the defendant’s prior convictions in large part because
“[t]he similarity between [the prior conviction] and the . . . offense for which
Brown [was] charged . . . create[d] a high risk of unfair prejudice as ‘the jury
may [have] infer[red] unfairly that Brown ha[d] a propensity to commit firearms offenses.’”261 It seems that this circuit makes no distinction between
“prejudicial effect” and “unfair prejudice.”
In United States v. Chauncey, the Eighth Circuit quoted Rule 609 directly,
including its use of the phrase “prejudicial effect” rather than “unfair prejudice.”262 Despite this, the court applied “unfair prejudice” later in its analysis.263 The court stated, “Here, the prior conviction already was admitted under Rule 404(b), and the danger of unfair prejudice by repetition of the
evidence was negligible,”264 and that “[w]eighed against the minimal danger
of unfair prejudice, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that the
probative value justified use of the evidence for impeachment.”265 The court,
thus, treats the two phrases interchangeably, as well.266
2. First Circuit
The only circuit to comprehensively address the absence of the word “unfair” in Rule 609’s internal balancing test is the First Circuit in United States

257. Id. at 38–39 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 39.
259. United States v. Brown, 606 F. Supp. 2d 306, 311–12, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 314 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Joe, No. 07 Cr.734
(JFK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55036 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008)).
262. United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2005).
263. Id.
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (contrasting Rule 609, under which a
court may admit a conviction of the defendant if the probative value outweighs its “prejudicial effect,”
and Rule 403, under which a court may admit a conviction of a government witness if the probative
value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”).
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v. Tse.267 The court dealt with the distinction in the application of subsection
(a) of the rule—the section under discussion here, covering prior felonies.268
This case treats the distinction between Rule 403’s “unfair prejudice” and
Rule 609’s “prejudice” as important rather than ignoring it.269 Not too many
years later, disappointingly, the First Circuit—with the alacrity of a golden
retriever upon its initiation into lake swimming—later muddied the very waters to which it supplied a shimmer of clarity in its discussion of Rule 609(b),
the section dealing with the effect of convictions being older than ten years.270
a. “Unfair” and Rule 609(a)
In 1998, Clyde Tse was the target of a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) sting using cooperating witness, Stephen Williams.271 The DEA
agents gave Williams $450 to use to purchase cocaine from Tse and equipped
Williams with a wireless microphone so the agents could record Williams’s
conversation.272 However, the feed to Williams’s microphone was lost when
he and Tse drove off in Williams’s car.273 Williams testified that the two drove
to a nearby house where Tse entered and returned therefrom with a bag of
cocaine.274 Although surveillance teams were in the area, none were able to
establish Williams’s account.275 Lab tests confirmed that the bag Williams
handed DEA agents contained cocaine.276
Agents set a second sting for Tse, again using Williams as a cooperating
witness.277 This time, the microphone functioned, and agents were able to
record the entire transaction between Williams and Tse for sixty-two grams
of cocaine.278 Tse was subsequently charged by a grand jury with two counts
of distributing a controlled substance, one for each of the encounters.279 Tse
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
Tse, 375 F.3d at 164.
See FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
Tse, 375 F.3d at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152–53.
See id.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pled guilty to the sting where the microphone worked, but he opted to go to
trial for the unrecorded incident.280
Because of the equipment malfunction, the prosecution was forced to rely
on Williams’s testimony.281 Tse capitalized on Williams’s spotty past, making sure the jury knew that
Williams had used and sold drugs in the past, had been convicted of
at least one crime, had made inaccurate statements to the grand jury
about his prior involvement with drugs, had received substantial
compensation for his work as a DEA informant, and had purchased a
new car shortly after receiving payments from the DEA.282
The jury, nonetheless, found Tse guilty.283 He was sentenced to 120 months
in prison for both convictions.284
On appeal to the First Circuit, Tse asserted that “the district court erred .
. . by preventing [Tse] from . . . impeaching Williams’s credibility [with] evidence that Williams had been convicted of assault and battery against a police
officer.”285 On this issue, the district court was first going to admit the evidence but reexamined that position when the issue of Tse’s own previous conviction for assault and battery of a police officer came up during a sidebar
conference.286 Though the court noted that there was some difference in the
language of Rule 609 between evidence of a defendant’s priors and another
witness’s priors, the district court felt (without legal basis) that if one should
be admitted, then so should the other.287 The district court chose to bar both
convictions from evidence.288
On appeal, the First Circuit soundly disagreed with the district court’s
interpretation of Rule 609, holding, instead, that there is a significant difference between the analysis required for defendant witnesses and all other witnesses.289 The court further noted that Rule 609 requires a Rule 403 analysis
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
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Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
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for credibility evidence offered regarding other witnesses, whereas the internal Rule 609(a)(1)(B) analysis is applied to the accused.290 The court stated:
Rule 609 distinguishes between the accused and mere witnesses. A
court may admit a conviction of the accused only if the probative
value “outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” By contrast,
a court shall admit a conviction of a government witness unless that
conviction should be excluded under Rule 403. The burden under
Rule 403 is . . . that the probative value “is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.”291
The court recognized that, in contrast, Rule 609(a)(1)(B) states that evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions will be admitted “if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.”292
The First Circuit not only recognized the lack of the word “unfair” in Rule
609 but also interpreted it as an important distinction of law.293 Thus, a defendant’s prior conviction can only be admitted if the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect whatsoever.294 According to the First Circuit,
this is meant to give the accused a higher level of protection from impeachment due to a previous conviction than any other witness.295
The importance of the First Circuit’s analysis cannot be overstated. First,
it demonstrates an unrecognized circuit split, which necessitates eventual resolution.296 Second, it highlights that the crucial language of the rule, discussed
herein, articulates a real distinction that must be accounted for in both analyzing and applying the rule.297
While the First Circuit’s insight is striking given the remaining circuits’
blind spot to the actual language of Rule 609, the court, nonetheless, was never
actually confronted with fully applying its correct understanding of the rule,
because the trial court kept the prior convictions of both the defendant and
290. Id.
291. Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).
292. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).
293. Tse, 375 F.3d at 164.
294. See id. (noting that a defendant’s conviction can be admitted only if the probative value “outweighs its prejudicial effect to the [defendant]”).
295. See id. at 163–64.
296. See infra Section II.E.
297. See Tse, 375 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he standard for the admission of prior convictions of the accused
is stricter than the standard for the admission of prior convictions of a government witness.”).
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another witness from the jury—having incorrectly concluded that the same
standard applied in both contexts.298 Thus, after analyzing the rule and delivering its apt understanding of the key phrase discussed herein, the appellate
court merely determined that the district court erred in employing the same
standard for the admission of prior crimes against a criminal defendant versus
other witnesses,299 a correct holding regardless of whether or not a court reads
“unfair” into the rule.300
Moreover, no remand was ordered, as the appellate court unsurprisingly
(descriptively, not normatively) concluded that the trial court’s dramatic misunderstanding of the rule—irrespective of the “unfairness” issue—was, nonetheless, “harmless.”301 So, neither the circuit nor the district court ever applied
the uniquely correct reading of Rule 609 by any federal court.302
Notwithstanding the First Circuit’s singular recognition of the explicit
language of Rule 609, the application of the rule by the district courts in the
First Circuit has proven at least somewhat disappointing. In United States v.
Mahone, the defendant filed a motion in limine, asking the United States District Court for the District of Maine to decide whether several of his prior
convictions would be admissible under Rule 609 should he take the stand.303
Mahone hoped to exclude prior convictions for forgery, theft by receiving,
aggravated assault, and possession of a controlled substance.304
Since forgery is a crime of dishonesty, the court held that this conviction
was automatically admitted under Rule 609(a)(2).305 The court also held that
the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance were not crimes of dishonesty and were also inadmissible under the
Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test since they held virtually no probative value for
truthfulness.306 The court noted that there was some controversy over whether
theft by receiving is a crime of dishonesty but found that it did not matter as
298. Id. at 153–54.
299. Id. at 164.
300. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (stating the requirements needed to admit evidence against a defendant versus a witness, which highlights their differences).
301. Tse, 375 F.3d at 164.
302. See id. at 164–65 (highlighting that although there is a difference in interpretation that should
be accounted for, in this specific case the district court’s error was harmless).
303. 328 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D. Me. 2004).
304. Id. In addition, Mahone sought to exclude evidence of some past acts under Rule 404, as well
as some expert testimony. Id. These are not relevant for our purposes, however.
305. Id. at 82–83.
306. Id. at 83–85.
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this conviction would be admissible under the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing
test.307 The court ruled:
The probative value of the Defendant’s conviction for theft
by receiving stolen property outweighs any prejudicial effect
of admitting the evidence. The nature of the crime reflects
on the Defendant’s credibility and veracity; the conviction
occurred in 2000[,] and the Defendant was on probation
from the conviction when arrested on the instant charges;
and the difference between possessing a stolen credit card
and robbing a bank is sufficient that a jury will not likely
consider it “propensity” evidence. While the Defendant’s
credibility may be a central issue at trial if he chooses to testify, the possibility that admission of this evidence will discourage him from taking the stand is not sufficient to outweigh its probative value.308
While the court’s focus on “propensity evidence”309 effectively reflects
an analysis of unfair prejudice, that attention doesn’t inform us as to whether
the court was only evaluating unfair prejudice or was considering it as part of
a broader analysis of all prejudice.310 And notwithstanding that a proper application of the rule would have led to an exclusion of any defendant’s prior
convictions, we do not know whether the court implicitly read Rule 609 to
mean “unfair prejudice” rather than “prejudicial effect” or simply misapplied
the rule as written.311 Though Mahone was convicted in this case and appealed
to the First Circuit, he did not raise the Rule 609 issue on appeal; so, the First
Circuit did not have a chance to address this issue.312

307. Id. at 83.
308. Id. at 84.
309. Id.
310. See id. at 84–85 (discussing “propensity evidence” and how it is unclear whether it refers to
just unfair prejudice or all prejudice).
311. See id. at 85.
312. See United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2006). Though not mentioned in the
case, it is likely that Mahone chose not to take the stand after the district court held that his prior
convictions would be admissible as impeachment evidence. Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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b. “Unfair” in Rule 609(b)
The First Circuit did not extend its proper reading of Rule 609(a) to Rule
609(b)—the section generally barring evidence of prior convictions older than
ten years.313 Rule 609(b) states that convictions of any witness older than ten
years are not admissible unless the “probative value . . . substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”314
Unfortunately, in United States v. Nguyen, the First Circuit used “prejudicial effect” and “unfair prejudice” interchangeably, just like the other circuits do for Rule 609(a), even though this case was decided after the First
Circuit’s own decision in United States v. Tse.315 In Nguyen, the appellantdefendant Quoc Nguyen had been charged along with three others for beating
Tommy Nguyen over an unpaid gambling debt.316 The jury convicted Quoc
Nguyen.317 He appealed, claiming that the lower court improperly barred him
from impeaching Tommy Nguyen’s character with a previous felony conviction received on May 23, 1996, which did not result in incarceration, for auto
entry.318 Since the trial began on June 14, 2006, the conviction fell just outside
the ten-year window presumptively allowed by Rule 609(b).319 Therefore, the
only way Tommy Nguyen’s conviction could have been allowed in was if the
court found “that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific
facts and circumstances substantially outweigh[ed] its prejudicial effect.”320
The trial court excluded Tommy Nguyen’s conviction, noting that Quoc Nguyen did not provide “any specific facts or circumstances showing that the probative value of Tommy Nguyen’s earlier conviction overbalanced its unfairly
prejudicial effect.”321
The First Circuit affirmed.322 Importantly, the First Circuit did not challenge the lower court’s use of “unfair” in reference to Rule 609(b); in fact, the
appellate court used the same language itself.323 After quoting directly from
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
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FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Nguyen, 542 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278.
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(b)).
Id. (emphasis added) (noting that this rule lacks the word “unfair,” just like Rule 609(a)).
Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 278, 281.
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Rule 609(b), the court said, “In short, Rule 609(b) is a rule of exclusion that
bars the admission of a stale felony conviction for impeachment purposes in
the absence of a particularized showing that its probative value substantially
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”324 Later in its analysis, the court
reverted back to the “prejudicial effect” language.325 And even later, the court
stated that the district court “considered all the pertinent factors, did not seize
on any improper factors, and reached a plausible conclusion as to the balance
of probative worth and unfairly prejudicial effect.”326 Even though Rule
609(b) has the same language of “prejudicial effect” that Rule 609(a) has, the
First Circuit acted as if “unfair prejudice” and “prejudicial effect” are interchangeable.327 Needless to say, the court did not give any reason for this divergence from its prior singular opinion.328
E. Modern Textualism as a Normative Process
The question that is presented is whether courts should hew strictly to the
language of Rule 609 or follow some other interpretive technique. Justice
Elena Kagan famously stated that “we’re all textualists now.”329 This transformation in judicial philosophy was due in no small part to the influence and
legacy of the late Justice Antonin Scalia.330 In his time on the bench, Justice
Scalia changed the way we talk and write about constitutional law and statutory interpretation.331 As Stanford Law Professor Bernadette Meyler put it,
“The florid rhetoric of his opinions, especially his dissents, addressed not only
324. Id. at 278 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 322 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33, 46 (1st Cir. 2000)).
325. Id. at 280. “The qualitative requirement for ‘specific facts and circumstances’ and the quantitative requirement that probative value be shown ‘substantially’ to outweigh prejudicial effect combine to make the barrier to admissibility of stale convictions under Rule 609(b) much higher than the
barrier for the admissibility of recent convictions under Rule 609(a).” Id.
326. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
327. Compare id. at 278, 281 (conflating “unfair prejudice” and “prejudicial effect”), with United
States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that applying a “uniform standard of exclusion” would be an error of law).
328. Nguyen, 542 F.3d at 280.
329. Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015) https://youtu.be/dpEtszFT0Tg?t=501.
330. Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 91 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 303, 304, 313 (2017) (reflecting on the influence of Justice Scalia).
331. Bernadette Meyler, Stanford Law Faculty on Justice Scalia’s Legacy, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL
AGGREGATE (Feb. 15, 2016) https://law.stanford.edu/2016/02/15/stanford-law-faculty-on-justicescalia/.
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his fellow justices and lower courts but also a constituency within the nation.
His interpretive theory of originalism reached out and captured that nation.”332
Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation was
heavily influenced by a literary technique called New Criticism, which calls
for readers to stick to the “four corners” of a writing whenever possible, rather
than using outside sources to interpret it.333 Ideally, the intent, or perceived
intent, of the authors should not be an interpretive factor.334
One way to think about this approach is to relate it to viewing images in
clouds. Often, we see identifiable figures; children make a game of spotting
them.335 As these are generally understood to result from random meteorological events, we don’t talk about the “intent” behind the impressions.336 Yet
the images are manifest irrespective of the absence of intent in their creation.337 While nobody doubts that legislation results from conscious efforts of
many people—so, intentions exist, indeed various ones—legislators have
their own individual understandings and intents (or no individual understanding and intent at all) in the drafting process. Notwithstanding this disparity of
intentions, in the end, there’s only one piece of legislation that was adopted
by at least a majority of legislators, including those who voted for it as a bitter
pill.338 As such, the legislation is like the cloud: it is to be interpreted alone,
without reference to any ephemeral “intentions” behind it.
In other words, how do we take that amalgam of disparate and conflicting
intentions, as well as the absence of any specific intent of those with an equal
vote in the legislative process, and derive a cohesive meaning therefrom?339
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See generally Jeremy Deaton, Marshmallows or Elvis? What You See in the Clouds Might Say
Something About You, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/11/06marshmallows-or-michael-jackson-what-you-see-clouds-might-saysomething-about-you/ (discussing the concept of “pareidolia,” which is the tendency to see images in
the clouds).
336. See generally id.
337. Id.
338. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) (explaining how textualists assert that “raw policy” impulses never make it into final legislation because
legislators must adapt and cater their individual intentions to overcome approval obstacles such as
“threatened filibusters,” “conference committees,” and “veto threats”).
339. Id. at 431–32 (explaining the inherent problems of interpreting legislation through “intentions”
when the drafting legislators have vastly different opinions from one another and “compromise because they want some other objective” or introduce unrelated and arbitrary provisions to strategically
pass bills).
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Equally, how do we ascribe intentions to those various legislators in the several states that enacted a copy of Rule 609?340 Do the ascribed intentions of
federal legislators travel with the explicit language adopted at the state
level?341 In textualism, we do not try to answer these unsolvable riddles.342
Rather, we look at the words and structure of the provision under review.343
Legislators’ statements can be useful to understand what ambiguous words
mean—as those elected officials are people of the time using the contemporary vernacular—but to be clear, so are myriad other sources.344 In the context
of Rule 609, in fact, we saw this occur with respect to the meaning of “defendant.”345 “Defendant” can mean only a criminal defendant or both a criminal and a civil defendant in both common vernacular and technical legal writing.346 So, the Supreme Court looked at, inter alia, the structure of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to determine which definition applies.347 As discussed,
however, using that same objective method of interpretation doesn’t allow for
“prejudice” to have two drastically different meanings within the same law,
no less one wholly inconsistent with the term’s understood meaning in evidence law.348
A key virtue of textualism is that it not only minimizes the ability of
340. See L. Kinvin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30
VILL. L. REV. 1315, 1315–39 (1985) (illustrating how within ten years after implementation, nine
states adopted Rule 609 either outright or nearly verbatim and many others adopted substantially similar versions).
341. Id.
342. See Anton Melitsky, The Roberts Court and the New Textualism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 671,
675 (2016) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)) (“[C]ourts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is
complete.’”).
343. See id. at 684 (citing Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1091 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added) (showing how Justice Kagan, in her dissent, disregarded the intended purpose
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent destruction of “objects” of evidence in financial fraud cases and
asserted that defendant should have been charged for “destroying” the “object” of an illegally caught
undersized fish).
344. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Can a Statute Have More Than One Meaning?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 213,
223–24 (2019) (discussing how dictionary definitions, “ordinary” meaning, and meaning intended by
Congress can be incompatible).
345. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (recognizing how the word
“defendant” in Rule 609(a)(1) is ambiguous and could be interpreted to encompass a civil defendant,
a criminal defendant, or both).
346. See id.
347. Id. at 508–10.
348. See supra Section II.A.1.
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judges to smuggle in their personal-policy preferences but also offers predictability in the interpretation of the law in general, providing for greater legitimacy in a system that ultimately rests on popular support for its perpetuation.349 Thus, ambiguities aren’t resolved by the use of idiosyncratic
explanations by legislators (or their staff) in the drafting process but, rather,
through an examination of the common understanding of language—as that is
what is most universal to drafters and, more importantly, those subject to the
new laws.350 All of this is an attempt, posited as the best, to give reasonable
meaning to a process inherently filled with indeterminacy, as words themselves always have some ambiguity.351 Language is a near-magical means to
convey ideas—as well as the medium through which ideas are both limited
and enhanced at the same time; thus, we better understand a notion when we
create key terminology to explain it, but the absence of unlimited linguistic
options cabins our ability to imagine, no less explore, concepts beyond our
current grasp.352 Thus understood, the enterprise of looking behind the curtain
349. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helix Energy Sols. Grp., 983 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (“Perhaps strangest of all, the dissent quotes a snippet of legislative history from 1997 to support its contention that overtime pay just shouldn’t apply to high earners.
The dissent neglects to mention that the sentiment it imputes to ‘Congress’ is nothing more than a
floor statement by a lone House member, in support of a proposed FLSA amendment that never got
so much as a vote. This is not even good purposivism, let alone good textualism.”), vacated, 989 F.3d
418 (5th Cir. 2021). Compare id. at 802–03 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“Those of us
who were born, bred, and educated in the ‘oil patch,’ and who practiced mineral law for decades, are
quite familiar with the levels of personnel who work the various on-shore and off-shore oil rigs and
platforms. . . . I fear that the result of the panel majority’s opinion will have lasting, negative repercussions, not just on the petroleum industry, but on all industries in this region and in any region that
finds the panel majority’s opinion persuasive.”), vacated, 989 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2021), with id. (Ho,
J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (“Those of us who were born, bred, and educated
in textualism are unfamiliar with the ‘bad for business’ theory of statutory interpretation offered by
the dissent under the purported flag of textualism. No one of course doubts the importance of the
energy industry to the health and prosperity of our nation. But these are policy arguments that should
be presented to Congress and the Secretary, not the judiciary. ‘These are battles that should be fought
among the political branches and the industry[—]not . . . by appeal to the Judicial Branch.’ I remain,
as always, willing—indeed, duty bound—to go wherever the text leads. For it is the text enacted by
the political branches that leads—and the judiciary that follows.”), vacated, 989 F.3d 418 (5th Cir.
2021).
350. See Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written Word Is
the Law,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 pm), https:www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposiumthe-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law/ (discussing how Justice Kavanaugh asserts that “interpretation contrary to ordinary meaning undermines the rule of law and democratic
accountability”).
351. See id.
352. See generally Vyvyan Evans, What Do We Use Language For?, PSYCH TODAY (Dec. 14,
2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/language-in-the-mind/201412/what-do-we-use-
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of language to capture intent reveals itself as far more fantastical than proponents propound.353
Justice Scalia applied the textualist method to constitutional interpretation, stressing the “original public meaning” rather than the intent of the authors.354 Conservative scholars argue that this is more “democratically legitimate” since it relies on how most people at the time understood the words in
the document rather than any subjective, no less questionable, authorial intent.355 Justice Clarence Thomas once described how textualism mandated
that Justice Scalia and others on the Court overturn the conviction of an undoubtedly unsympathetic defendant in Crawford v. Washington—not because
the justices wanted that outcome in the case, but because the text of the Constitution mandated it.356
Justice Gorsuch further outlines the textualist approach in another case in
which the outcome at least facially seems contrary to the authoring justice’s
personal political preferences.357 In the majority opinion, holding that Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination also encompasses acts of bias against
homosexuals,358 Justice Gorsuch states that the Supreme Court “normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the
time of its enactment”359 since the actual text of the statute, and no other
sources, is what was actually enacted.360 Allowing judges to bring in other
sources is dangerous, Justice Gorsuch says, because it opens the possibility of
judicial amendment of statutes through reinterpretation.361 It would also mean
that the meaning of a law would be constantly subject to change, leaving

language (“[L]anguage allows quick and effective expression[] and provides a well-developed means
of encoding and transmitting complex and subtle ideas.”).
353. See id.
354. See O’Scannlain, supra note 330 (discussing the “original public meaning”).
355. See generally Skrmetti, supra note 350.
356. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For a discussion of this case by Justice Clarence Thomas, see Clarence
Thomas, Assoc. Just. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., Keynote Speech at the Nineteenth Annual Banquet of the
Texas Review of Law & Politics (Apr. 9, 2016).
357. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (showing Justice Gorsuch’s commitment to
analyzing Title VII provisions through a textualist approach and outlining the potential slippery slope
presented by judicial reinterpretation).
358. Id. (illustrating the Court’s textualist approach in interpreting Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination).
359. Id. at 1738.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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citizens unsure whether they can rely on it in their daily lives.362
Justice Gorsuch points out that the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled
that courts have no further role when a statute’s meaning is “plain.”363 The
public should not have to worry that the courts could suddenly “disregard [the
statute’s] plain terms” in favor of some other source.364 Justice Gorsuch allows for extratextual sources to clear up ambiguities in textual language.365
This is perfectly acceptable, he says, when kept to this limited task (and not
used to mask a search for “legislative intent”).366 As the Supreme Court stated
previously, “Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant
to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”367 Justice Gorsuch holds that when the
text is clear, no legislative history can change its meaning—even if the broad,
general applications of the language were not clear to the original drafters.368
Justice Gorsuch emphasizes the fact that the actual text of the law governs,
not “the principal concerns of our legislators.”369
At the same time, legislative histories and other sources can be useful for
courts in applying the correct governing meaning of a statute’s terms: the “ordinary meaning at the time of enactment.”370 Since meanings and nuances of
words can change over time, courts must be sure to apply the statute’s original
meaning, as that is what was actually enacted.371 Also, statutory language can
often be different than the meaning of words “when viewed individually or
literally.”372 For this purpose, legislative history is useful for determining the
contemporary and contextual definition of terms but, as such, is clearly “not
always conclusive.”373
Justice Gorsuch offers as an example the 1931 case wherein the Court
found that the 1919 National Motor Vehicle Theft Act governed only land
vehicles and not air or water vehicles since “contextual clues” in the law
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1749.
364. Id. (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009); Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011)).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1750.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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pointed that way and the “everyday speech” in 1919 used the term “vehicle”
to only mean motor vehicles.374 In another case, the Court held that the term
“contract[] of employment” referred to both independent contractors and employee contracts since that was the prevailing meaning at the time the relevant
law was passed.375
Justice Gorsuch draws a contrast between a claim that “statutory language
bears some other meaning” and whether legislators at the time of enactment
“expected today’s result.”376 Justice Gorsuch rejects the latter as an interpretive tool377: “When a new application emerges that is both unexpected and
important, [some] would seemingly have us merely point out the question,
refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to enforce the plain terms of
the law in the meantime.”378
Justice Gorsuch further eschews any meaningful distinction between the
“expected application[]” of a law and “legislative intent,” the latter of which
the Court has said is irrelevant for unambiguous statutes.379 Looking to “expected applications” achieves the same result as looking at legislative intent:
limiting the application of a statute to only the principal concern of certain
vocal legislators while ignoring the more general application of the statute’s
actual plain language.380 This framework, says Justice Gorsuch, would “impermissibly . . . displace the plain meaning of the law in favor of something
lying beyond it.”381
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that when a statute is unambiguous, “whether a specific application was anticipated by Congress ‘is irrelevant.’”382 Justice Gorsuch argues that “applying protective laws to groups that
were politically unpopular at the time of the law’s passage—whether prisoners in the 1990s383 or homosexual and transgender employees in the 1960s—
often may be seen as unexpected.”384 However, this is no reason not to enforce
374. Id. (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931)).
375. Id. (quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536–37 (2019)).
376. Id. (emphasis added).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1751 (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
383. See generally Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (holding Title II of the
ADA extends to prisoners).
384. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
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the law as written.385 To do so would unjustly benefit “the strong or popular”
and deny equal benefit of the law.386
Justice Gorsuch further opines that should any law only apply to individuals that some “(yet-to-be-determined) group” intended it to apply to, rather
than to all implied by the statute’s language, then “we’d have more than a little
law to overturn.”387 For example, cases extending protection to male employees, especially protecting male employees from harassment by other males,
were quite likely unforeseen by the original drafters of Title VII388: “As we
acknowledged at the time, ‘male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace
was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII.’”389
And this would only be the beginning, according to Justice Gorsuch.390
The words of various enactments have long been recognized as “difficult to .
. . control.”391 In the context of Title VII, this is likely due in no small part to
the intentions (pun recognized) of Representative Howard Smith, the legislator who introduced the original language of Title VII regarding sex discrimination as a poison pill.392 Smith offered the language, “[n]ot necessarily because he was interested in rooting out sex discrimination in all its forms, but
because he . . . thought that adding language covering sex discrimination
would serve as a poison pill [for the whole Civil Rights Act].”393 Nonetheless,
that language is part of the enacted statute.
Since the statutory language is so broad, Justice Gorsuch pointed out in
Bostock that “many, maybe most, applications of Title VII’s sex provision
were ‘unanticipated’” when it was adopted.394 Many of these applications
seem perfectly obvious to us now but were highly controversial in the early

385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
390. Id.
391. Id. (citing Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1338 (2012) (quoting Federal Mediation Service To Play Role in Implementing
Title VII, [1965–1968 Transfer Binder] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8046, at 6074 (Feb. 7, 1996))).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1752 (citing CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 11518 (1985)).
394. Id.
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days of the law.395 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission originally held that having separate listings for men and women “was
simply helpful rather than discriminatory.”396 It was not deemed illegal in
some jurisdictions for an employer to fire “an employee for refusing his sexual
advances,” or to refuse to hire mothers of young children without a similar
policy toward fathers.397
Over time, the broad, general nature of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition became undeniable, Justice Gorsuch pointed out.398 The EEOC
changed course on job postings before the end of the 1960s—the Court ruled
in 1971 that women with children could not be treated differently than men
with children—and the Court was increasingly moving toward recognizing
sexual harassment as sex discrimination by the end of the same decade.399
Justice Gorsuch pointed out that, while these seem to be perfectly natural applications of Title VII’s sex provision to us now, they were not considered so
in the early days of the law and were hotly debated.400
Justice Gorsuch rejected “naked policy appeals.”401 That is not statutory
interpretation at all; rather, it amounts to legislating from the bench, replacing
Congress’s words with judicial policy making, said Justice Gorsuch.402 The
judiciary, he said, should avoid doing this at all costs.403 He continued: Congress alone should pass new laws “or address unwanted consequences of old
legislation”;404 courts can only apply the law as written;405 courts have no legal, moral, or expert authority to change policies enacted by the people
through their elected representatives beyond the limitations of the Constitution.406 The courts can no more limit the scope of the law, said Justice

395. Id.
396. Id. (citing Franklin, supra note 391, at 1340 (citing Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n (Sept. 22, 1965) (on file with the EEOC Library, Washington D.C.))).
397. Id. (citing Barnes v. Train, No. 1828–73, 1974 WL 10628, *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974) (unreported); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), rev’d, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per
curiam)).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1753.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1738.
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Gorsuch, than they can add to it.407
Justice Gorsuch’s analysis aptly foretold the proper interpretation of Rule
609: since Congress enacted language that bars all character for truthfulness
evidence against criminal defendants—albeit in a circuitous fashion—confused statements of several legislators cannot change the unadorned dictates
of the law.408 As Justice Gorsuch acknowledged, the “expected application[]”
of the law doesn’t trump the enacted language.409 Appeals to either “expected
applications” or “legislative intent” ignore the rule’s actual plain language.410
Before fully embracing this analysis, however, two interpretative principles
must be considered: the scrivener’s error and the absurdity doctrine.411
1. Scrivener’s Error
Courts often follow the maxim that they may correct legislative drafting
mistakes, known as scriveners’ errors.412 This is a narrow rule, however, applying only if the mistakes are patently clear.413 If the language is merely
likely a mistake, but not definitively one, then courts will apply the plain text
rather than attempt to fix the perceived issue.414 The rationale for this limitation is the same as what underlies textualism itself: courts should be interpreting the words given them by the legislature, not providing their own judgment
on policy in place of elected representatives, intentionally or otherwise.415
This doctrine is usually relegated to fixing only “internal textual inconsistenc[ies] or . . . obvious error[s] of grammar, punctuation, or English usage.”416 Is the lack of “unfair” in Rule 609 a conscious word choice or an
407. Id. at 1753.
408. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1752.
411. Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 816–17 (2016) (defining
“scrivener’s error” as a term of art referring to a legislative mistake of transcription).
412. Id. at 811.
413. Id. at 812 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
414. Id. (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
415. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.64, 82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “For the
sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to me, is that the meaning genuinely intended
but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather
than correcting a technical mistake. That condition is not met here.” Id.
416. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2460 n.265 (2003) (critiquing the absurdity doctrine).
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obvious error in grammar, meaning, or transposition?417 To conclude that
“unfair” was inadvertently omitted in a final printing or the like is belied by
the detailed history described above.418 “Unfair” was removed midway during
the deliberative process.419 Notwithstanding that several legislators spoke
about the bill indicating that they were seemingly unaware of the change, critically, the change preceded various intermediate ratifications.420 Thus, regardless of what some legislators thought, various versions of the bill—along with
the final language—were repeatedly ratified by each body that considered it
with the locution on full display.421 The scrivener’s error doctrine is not designed to correct bad legislating, it’s designed to correct process oversights.422
This was no process mistake.
2. Absurdity Doctrine
A related maxim of interpretation is the absurdity doctrine, alluded to
above, which states that courts will interpret statutes in contravention of their
plain meaning if the result of doing otherwise would be absurd.423 The Supreme Court phrased the doctrine this way in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors:
“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be
avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose
are available.”424 The classic example of this doctrine comes from medieval
Italy, where a doctor who assisted a patient in the public street was exempted
“from a law punishing ‘whoever drew blood in the streets.’”425 In that instance, the law had been intended to stop violence, and the court reasoned that

417. See id. (“This premise arguably distinguishes a genuine scrivener’s error doctrine from the
absurdity doctrine, which focuses on putative mistakes of policy expression and therefore risks disturbing a legislative bargain over the precise way a given statutory policy should be articulated.”).
418. See supra Section II.B.2.
419. See supra Section II.B.2.
420. See supra Section II.B.2.
421. Doerfler, supra note 411 (clarifying that a scrivener’s error is where legislative text diverges
from what Congress meant to say, not what Congress should have said).
422. Manning, supra note 416, at 2388 (defining the absurdity doctrine as the idea that judges may
deviate from statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce an absurd result).
423. See id.
424. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing United
States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542–43 (1940); Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S.
389, 394 (1940)).
425. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1007 (2006) (defending the absurdity
doctrine by illustrating its promotion of fairness).
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applying it to a physician performing emergency care would not accomplish
the law’s intended purpose and would be harmful to the public good.426 In a
more recent case, the Supreme Court ruled in 1868 that a sheriff and his posse,
who arrested an on-duty mail carrier wanted for murder, did not violate the
law against impeding the delivery of mail, even though they had by a literal
reading of the statute.427
The rule stems from the notion that since Congress is incapable of foreseeing every possible outcome, it crafts general rules.428 When an unforeseen
absurd result would occur from the application of a general rule to a specific,
unique case, the judiciary will interpret the rule so as to avoid that absurdity.429
As traditionally understood, this is “a normal function of the interpretive process,” rather than a judicial rewriting of the law.430
While this doctrine has existed for quite some time in American courts,431
it is not without its apt critics.432 Some new textualists, most notably John
Manning in his article The Absurdity Doctrine, object that the doctrine could
destabilize the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches, among other undesirable consequences.433 New textualists like
Manning are skeptical that the absurdity doctrine isn’t anything more than just
a dressed-up version of purposivism.434 As Manning states:
[T]he precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, unknowable
strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision to
forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision. So
understood, the legislative process is simply too complex
and too opaque to permit judges to get inside Congress’s
“mind.”435
Under this conception that equates the maxim with a search for legislative
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

116

Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1006–07; see also United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868).
Staszewski, supra note 425, at 1012.
Id.
Id. (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932); Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486–87).
Manning, supra note 416, at 2388.
Id. at 2391.
Id.; see also Staszewski, supra note 425, at 1008–12.
Manning, supra note 416, at 2390.
Id.
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intent, courts risk acting on their own personal wills and preferences if they
do anything other than apply the words of the statute as written.436 The “actual
commands” of the final law are more important than “the apparent background intent” of lawmakers.437 Since the absurdity doctrine calls for courts
to apply laws contrary to their written letter to avoid “absurd” results, the doctrine conflicts with new textualist philosophy on the role of the judiciary and
the proper method of legal interpretation.438 In their eyes, the absurdity doctrine undermines the separation of powers by letting courts modify statutes
beyond the express terms passed by Congress.439
Manning and other new textualists are also concerned that the absurdity
doctrine could be used to circumvent the rational basis test used to review the
constitutionality of legislation.440 This test states that “a judge may not disturb
a statutory classification simply because it produces seemingly unwise, improvident, or inequitable results” if the “legislation has any conceivable rational basis.”441 Manning believes that courts could invalidate a law that
would pass the rational basis test by declaring the results “absurd.”442
Manning argues that courts could significantly cut down on the number
of cases that implicate the absurdity doctrine by adopting the modern textualists’ context-dependent method of interpretation.443 By this, he does not mean
the subjective intent of the author, which he refers to as the “speaker’s meaning.”444 Rather, he means “how ‘a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words’ would have understood the statutory text, as applied to the problem
before the judge.”445 Also referred to as “objectified intent,”446 this contextdependent method of interpretation requires an interpreter to go beyond the
dictionary definition of a word to common cultural and legal connotations of

436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 2390, 2408–31; see also Staszewski, supra note 425, at 1008.
439. Manning, supra note 416, at 2391; see also Staszewski, supra note 425, at 1008–09.
440. Manning, supra note 416, at 2391.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 2455.
444. Id. at 2457.
445. Id. at 2458 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 59, 65 (1988)).
446. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 29, 33 (2006) (defining “objectified intent” as authorial intent which seems to
be the intent behind statutes if no subjective legislative intent exists).
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that word in a particular context.447
As an example of this method of interpretation, Manning quotes from
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Smith v. United States.448 In that case, the issue
before the court was whether the defendant had “used” a firearm during a drug
deal when he traded the firearm for drugs but never employed it as a
weapon.449 The majority said that he did, but Justice Scalia disagreed—producing a decidedly prodefendant outcome, contrary to Scalia’s known political preferences.450 Justice Scalia noted that
[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its
intended purpose. When someone asks, “Do you use a
cane?,” he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he
wants to know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to
speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, [i.e.], as a weapon.451
To demonstrate how Justice Scalia’s approach would greatly limit the
number of absurdity doctrine inquiries, Manning goes back to the classic example of the doctor who draws blood in the street.452 While the phrase “draw
blood” could abstractly refer either to an act of violence or a medical procedure, it would be understood by the reasonable reader in the context of the
statute under review to mean an act of violence since the law in that case was
part of a criminal code rather than a health code.453 Given the contextual
meaning of the phrase, the doctor would not be guilty of violating the law.454
Using this method of textual analysis, the court would not need to apply the
absurdity doctrine at all, since the absurd result would never arise in the first

447. Manning, supra note 416, at 2458–60.
448. Id. at 2460 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993)).
449. Id.
450. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Justice Scalia for the Defense?, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 687, 687
(2011) (noting that Justice Scalia was “[w]idely considered to be one of the most politically conservative Justices on the United States Supreme Court”).
451. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993). This is one of several cases in which Justice
Scalia interpreted a statute in a fashion likely inconsistent with his political preferences. See Davoli,
supra note 450.
452. Manning, supra note 416, at 2461.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 2460–61.
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place.455 This concept applies both to accepted cultural nuances as well as
commonly understood legal terms of art.456
Regarding those cases where the context-dependent method of interpretation does not negate the absurd result, Manning and new textualists suggest
that most, if not all, can be dealt with by recognizing the background legal
conventions that would have been assumed during a statute’s drafting.457 For
example, in the case of the sheriff who arrested the murderous mail carrier,
the common law defense of justification would absolve him for impeding the
delivery of mail without resorting to the absurdity doctrine.458 Or if, say, a
prisoner escaped from jail to avoid a fire (another oft-cited example from an
old English case), there would be no need to resort to the absurdity doctrine
to avoid punishing him when the common law defense of necessity is available.459 Both of these doctrines don’t change the meaning of a statute; they
provide for exceptions to the law’s application, respecting the role of the legislature in enacting laws.460
The application of the absurdity doctrine to Rule 609 is a stretch. Unlike
the multiple legitimate legal definitions of one term, “defendant,” discussed
in Green, in Rule 609, we’re confronted with the opposite: the Federal Rules
of Evidence has two separate terms, “unfair prejudice” and “prejudicial effect,” with two distinct understandings in the law, as recognized by the First
Circuit, that courts have routinely treated as one.461 That’s not to say that
many legislators involved in drafting Rule 609 didn’t seem ignorant of, or at
least unconcerned with, the important definitional differences.462 They did.
This alone, however, seems insufficient to trump the objective meaning of the
logically separate terms.
Moreover, the would-be asserted absurdity is not the result of the application of a general rule to a specific, uncontemplated circumstance.463 Rather,
the absurdity would be either that Congress left out a word—reverting back
to the scrivener’s error—or that the rule never permits Rule 609 evidence
455. Id.
456. Id. at 2464–65.
457. Id. at 2466.
458. Id. at 2468–69.
459. Id. at 2469.
460. See Staszewski, supra note 425, at 1014.
461. See Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 507–08 (1989).
462. See supra Section II.B.
463. See Manning, supra note 416 (explaining that part of the rationale behind the absurdity doctrine
is that legislators draft statutes with limited foresight).
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against an accused.464 Thus, it’s not specific and unique at all.465 The alleged
absurdity is universal.466 And eviscerating the distinction between two different terms, one encompassing the other, contravenes English-language structure and interpretative maxims, as discussed above, leaving us with words that
have no meaning in the same rule.467 That’s a hard pill to swallow if trying to
maintain fidelity to the text of the rule.468
Thus, the best way to address the problem is for Congress to correct it.469
This achieves two goals: First, it gives preeminence to the enacted words, regardless of their wisdom, or even lack thereof. Second, it reinforces the incentive for Congress to capably do its job, because when it doesn’t, it won’t
have another branch of government providing legislative janitorial services.470
In addition, the various states that have uncritically adopted Rule 609 would
likely follow suit.471
III. CONCLUSION
While Federal Rule of Evidence 609 allows for the introduction at trial of
certain convictions to impeach the credibility of any witness, only the aspect
of the rule that applies to criminal defendants subjects propounded evidence
to an internal balancing test that weighs probativeness against prejudice.472
The test applicable to all other witnesses is that found in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which states: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice.”473 Thus, the
specific articulation of the balancing test regarding criminal defendants considers all prejudice in the balancing test rather than just unfair prejudice. This
language produces a result whereby no credibility evidence survives the

464. Id. at 2390.
465. See supra Section II.C.
466. See supra Section II.C.
467. Manning, supra note 416, at 2390.
468. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
469. See John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397,
2426 (2017) (describing one of the benefits of textualism as satisfying the demand of legislative supremacy in its ability to address problems).
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. FED. R. EVID. 609.
473. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
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screen of the prejudice filter, making the rule nugatory.474 Adding to this confusion, or more likely because courts have unconsciously recognized this confounding dilemma, federal courts mostly have ignored the express language
of the rule—choosing to rewrite Congress’s words without offering any explanation for that usurpation of the legislative function.475 Rather than having
courts play legislators, judges should model the humility inherent to their constitutional role.476 This gives preeminence to the words enacted by Congress
and bolsters the motivation for Congress to capably do its job.477

474.
475.
476.
477.

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.D.
See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
See supra Section II.E.
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